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NEW CONCEPT FOR TRIAL OF AUTOMOBILE ACTIONS
By HAROLD R. PROWELL

*

N THE Magna Carta, in the works of Dickens, and in today's press, the
delays in the administration of justice have been the subject of unfavorable comment. The condition is chronic and the advent of the automobile
has accentuated the normal congestion of court calendars; but such delays
are obviously not an invention of our generation.
With characteristic American ingenuity, the condition has been met, in
many jurisdictions, by reforms in adjective law. In most fields of the law,
the courts have kept pace with the demands of the times. But in the field
of negligence actions-particularly, actions for property damage and personal
injuries arising out of automobile accidents-the problem remains acute.
Pennsylvania has made some strides to unchoke the calendars of its trial
courts, but the degree of effectiveness of these attempts depends largely on
the attitude of the judges in the Courts of Common Pleas throughout the state
toward these innovations. It can be stated that there has not been unanimous
and enthusiastic acceptance and utilization of the authorized facilities for expediting litigation, by the trial judges in all judicial districts of the Commonwealth.
It must be recognized, however, that the problem is not one that will be
solved by the judges themselves, so long as they operate within a system which
was not designed to meet, and does not meet, the demands of society as presented by automobile accident cases. It is the system which must be revised
if the problem is to be met and solved.
Specifically, the jury system is out of step with the requirements of present day litigation of automobile negligence cases. While issue must be taken
with those who see a difference in kind between automobile accidents and
accidents generally, the press of motor vehicle litigation demands that it be
treated as such.
Lest the purists be shocked by a suggestion of revising the jury system
as applied to this type of case, let it be said that a modification only is contemplated. There is no need, and, indeed, I should oppose a suggestion, to
abolish the jury system in order to ease the congestion of our calendars. The
basic values of the jury system must be retained even though the traditional
* Member of the Pennsylvania Bar; A.B., Princeton, LL.B., University of Pennsylvania; General Counsel for American Automobile Association-Pennsylvania Motor Federation.

[ 269 )

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW[

[VOL. 61

form of the jury be altered materially to eliminate those factors which seem
to render the system unfit for the volume of automobile accident cases.
For example, why do we have twelve persons on a jury? The number
itself has no magic-and we have seen many expressions of this thought;
for, in many municipal courts, the number of jurors is less than twelve. Coroners' juries are less than twelve; grand juries number more than twelve. The
Code, known as the Duke of York's Laws, promulgated in 1664, provided
that no jury should exceed seven, nor be less than six in number, except that
in capital cases, twelve might be appointed. Furthermore, except in capital
cases, a verdict was to be found by a majority of the jury. With Penn's
"Laws, Agreed Upon in England", adopted in 1683, came the requirement of
twelve man juries and Pennsylvania courts have held that "the substantial
features which are to be 'as heretofore' (Constitution of 1874) are the number twelve and the unanimity of the verdict." 1 Yet, even in Pennsylvania,
the parties, by agreement, may submit a controversy for trial before fewer
than twelve jurors.' Juries consisting of fewer than twelve persons are provided for in California, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming. Oklahoma provides
for trials in courts not of record before six men, and Utah establishes a jury
of eight in courts of general jurisdiction. Furthermore, there is, in a number
of American jurisdictions, a perceptible movement away from the requirement
of unanimity.
The trial of criminal cases before a jury is a fundamental of English as
well as American thinking and jurisprudence. History has made it synonymous with the dignity and integrity of free men. And so, we have come to
associate trial by jury as an inherent right in civil as well as in criminal cases.
Having its origin in Roman law and finding its way into English law
through the Normans, the jury was not always a symbol of democracy. But
the genius of the English mind shaped it, from the compurgator and trial-byordeal and wager-of-law stages, into an instrumentality to "find the facts"
in an action at law. It was during the reign of the Tudor kings that the jury
became the shield against arbitrary government; and our own colonial experience was merely a reflection of the transformation which had been crystallizing in England.
Yet, in England itself, the concept of requiring jury trials in civil as well
as criminal cases has faded, for the use of civil juries has been drastically
limited there. A parallel trend manifests itself in America where the growth
v. The Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa. 481, 498, 36 Atl. 296 (1897).
Krugh v. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., 77 Pa. 15 (1874).
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of administrative bodies has been phenomenal. Furthermore, equity cases are
largely decided without juries, as are most Orphans' Court matters. Were it
not for the provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 that the right
of trial by jury shall be as heretofore and shall remain inviolate,3 there is little
doubt that Pennsylvania would be following that trend.
One of the important virtues of a jury is that the base of its decision is
wider than in that of a decision by a judge alone. One man can be biased
by reason of emotion, prejudice, misconception or malice, or err by sheer inadvertence. With a jury of many persons, the likelihood of all being swayed
by the same factor is reduced. The eccentricities of the one are balanced and
checked by the multiple nature of the jury. The decision of the jury is a composite of the group. This virtue, then, must be preserved as against suggestions for trials by a single judge.
To those who have tried criminal cases before a judge without a jury, it
should be apparent that a single judge is no sufficient substitute for the jury.
The factors of collective thinking and multiple reasoning, involving, as they
do, checks and balances of erratic individual thinking, are lacking. The accelerated tempo of the trial without a jury is a desirable objective to achieve,
but it must be sought within the basic framework of the jury concept.
It is for this reason, as well as for others, that the suggestion of substituting a compensation system for our present jury trial system, must be rejected. Whether he be a referee, administrator, examiner or a judge, one-man
decisions on the facts of a case should not be recklessly or even deliberately
substituted for the system whereby a jury "finds the facts."
Joseph H. Choate, in an address before the New York Bar, stated, ".
the united judgment of twelve honest and intelligent laymen . . .is far safer
and more likely to be right than the sole judgment of the . . . judge would
be. There is nothing in the scientific and technical training of . . . a judge
that gives his judgment (on questions of fact) superior virtue or value .
there is something in the technical training and habits of mind of the judge
that tends really to unfit him . . . and for his caprice, prejudice, his errors
of judgment, there is no (adequate) check or balance. . ..
By the same reasoning, a panel of legally-trained judges, although preferable to a trial by a single judge, would not serve to bring to the trial the
fresh point of view and diversity of thinking that is found in, and is one of
the great values of, the jury. A panel of judges tends to reflect a common back3 CONST. art. I, § 6.
4 MOSCHZISKER, TRIAL BY JURY, p. 71 (1930).
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ground, similar habits of thinking and a distinctly professional approach. A
court of three judges, for example, might represent, in some respects, a magnification of at least some of the weaknesses of a one-judge court.
The waste of time in trials before juries can be justified only if the results obtained are worth the inordinate expenditure of time and public funds
and, in addition, if the same results cannot be otherwise attained. Not only
does it require a greater length of time to try a case before a jury, but one
must consider the economic loss reflected in the additional fees to the lawyers
who conduct the protracted trial (a factor in insurance rates); the immobilization of twelve citizens (jurors), as well as the parties and their witnesses, in
their efforts to earn a living; the salaries paid the judge, court attaches and
attendants; and the overhead heating (or cooling), lighting, cleaning, and
maintaining a court room.
A suggestion for the solution sought may be found in a long established
practice in some counties in Pennsylvania, to wit, the use of associate judges
who are lay judges, that is, judges not "learned in the law". They do not
have the same background or the same scientific and technical training as
judges learned in the law.
Of course, the office of a lay judge had no existence at common law
nor was it created by the Constitution. In fact, the Constitution of 1874 abolished the office in counties which form separate judicial districts6 ; but the office
still exists as a purely statutory creation. (By the Act of April 4, 1834, the
Courts of Common Pleas were set up to consist of a President Judge and two
Associate Judges). This statutory device has demonstrated its utility wherever it has been used."
A trial court consisting of one judge learned in the law and two associate
judges not learned in the law-and all of them elected by the people-would
furnish a system of checks and balances and give a composite aspect to decisions on the facts in the case, similar to that of a jury.
Of course, the functions of the law judge and the lay judges might be
spelled out with greater clarity than under the present law relating thereto.
The law judge might be assigned the exclusive jurisdiction over questions of
law with the lay judges acting in, only an advisory capacity. On the other
hand, the three judges might, by majority vote, pass on questions of fact involved in the trial, that is, perform the functions now assigned to the jury.
',
Re Manck, 41 Co. Ct. 683 (Pa.)
6 O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 424 (1874); Re Jurisd. of Assoc. Judges, 3 Luz. Leg. Reg. 7.
7 Glamorgan Iron Co. v. Snyder, 84 Pa. 397 (1877).
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The two lay judges would inevitably reflect a contrasting background
and a distinct approach to the questions presented, from those of the law judge.
The lay judges would, by reason of their dissimilar training and contrasting
social and business contacts, bring to the court that freshness and spontaneity
of thought and mental attitude which is often lacking in a trial judge learned
in the law and immersed in legal tradition.
By this device, we preserve and retain in good measure the composite
aspect of a jury verdict, and at the same time gain the greater simplicity and
speed of a trial without a traditional jury. For the present, and until the experiment gives an expectation of success in expediting the disposition of the
present backlog of automobile accident cases, it should not be extended to
other types of cases or other fields of law.
It will be noted that no list of qualifications has been advanced for eligibility to the position of lay judge. This is deliberate. If it were to be proposed that certain educational requirements be established, we should decrease
pro tanto the value of the lay judges to the panel. It might be tempting to
suggest that one lay judge be a medical doctor and the second an engineer
or accountant or member of some other profession. Such a course, however
appropriate in theory, would pack the court with professional attitudes rather
than bring to the court the unfettered approach of the layman selected from a
cross-section of the community.
The members of the legal profession owe a duty to the public, as well
as to the profession, to expedite the administration of justice, without sacrificing civil rights. It is apparent that any movement toward abandoning those
bulwarks of human liberties with which our Anglo-Saxon tradition has endowed us, will be (and, of right, should be) scrutinized with a suspicious
eye; but, there must be a greater acceptance and more general use of pretrial conferences and discovery procedures, as well as other time-saving innovations, if the substance of justice is to be retained. A court with a chronically back-logged calendar is better than no court at all-but, to more than a
few litigants, it amounts, in effect, to a denial of civil rights.

